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LESSONS FROM A CHANGING JAPANt
John Owen Haleytt
As suggested by the title, these comments center on three propositions:
that Japan is changing; that somehow Japan in the process of such change has
something to teach us; and finally, that we have something to learn from
Japan.
Living in Japan over the past six months-the longest period during
which I have continuously lived in Japan since the early 1970's-I have been
startled by the extent of intellectual and material changes. Although some
may belittle the Japanese slogan kokusaika, I am deeply impressed by the
profound "internationalization" of Japanese attitudes and understanding. As
goods, services, and ideas flow in, Tokyo has become a contemporary Rome
without the empire. It is perhaps the world's most important economic,
political, and intellectual center, combining as no other single city so many
diverse centers of the highest international rank and profile.
Today more Japanese live and travel abroad than Americans, or
indeed, than citizens of any other country. As they return to all parts of
Japan, they bring with them new insights about themselves as well as other
cultures. Museums in regions far removed from Tokyo or Osaka routinely
bring exhibitions ranging from the best of contemporary Afro-American art to
Paul Klee. By simply reading Japanese newspapers and watching Japanese
television over the past six months, I have learned more about contemporary
and ancient China, the history, culture, and politics of the Middle East,
European civilization, and Africa, than I could possibly have gleaned from
the mass media in the United States in twice that period of time. As a result
of networking by Japan's public broadcast company, average Japanese have
access to daily news broadcasts from the principal national television
networks in New York, London, Frankfint, Paris, Moscow, and at least once
a week from Manila and Madrid. While we depend on our own network
news, the Japanese are exposed to daily analysis of international events from
at least five or six national perspectives a day.
The material aspects of Japan's "internationalization" require little
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explanation. Suffice it to say that, for a price, there is hardly any good or
service available outside of Japan that cannot be obtained within Japan. In
cities like Sendai, which is about the size of Portland, even neighborhood
convenience stores carry an assortment of foreign wares that rival the best of
our supermarkets and general merchandisers.
These changes are, needless to say, the products of the wealth created
by a generation of enormously productive Japanese. With Japan's industrial
success, however, has come the myriad of social, political, and economic
problems faced by every major industrial nation. Indeed, I can think of no
issue in contemporary America, from the environment to race relations,
political corruption to teenage crime, that Japan today does not also face. To
be sure some are more malignant for us than for Japan-and others are far
less serious for us than for the Japanese-but these are differences of degree,
not kind. Despite Japan's general ethnic homogeneity, for example, they too
must deal with issues of historical ethnic, status, and gender-based
discrimination.
They also confront serious problems of immigrant
assimilation as the number of workers from other parts of Asia and the
Middle East increases. In a country the size of Montana, only 20 percent of
which is arable, Japan must provide space for a population half as large as the
entire United States and an industrial base almost as large as ours. The
problems of pollution, urban life, and housing are obviously more extreme.
Many things about Japan have not changed. The Japanese have long
seen the world as an intellectual oyster and sought the pearls it has to offer.
They surpass perhaps any other nationality in their capacity to absorb ideas,
to learn from the successes and failures of others, to refashion, to adapt, and
to improve what they find in ways that add value, solve problems, and
generally contribute to the wealth and happiness of Japan. They have been
able to find analogies in the rich diversity of their own historical experience
and culture, thereby discovering how best to adapt new institutions and ideas.
While the Japanese may have been peculiarly weak in giving back to the
world anything other than the refashioned models they borrowed-from
military imperialism a century ago to integrated circuits today-their capacity
to use to the fullest the best the rest of the world has to give is not in doubt.
Herein lies the first lesson that we can learn from Japan. If Japan's
weakness (in giving something other than simply what they have learned from
abroad) has been our strength, at least in recent years their strength in
learning from others has been our weakness. For much of our history we
prospered with investment capital, technological innovations, and intellectual
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contributions from abroad-often but not exclusively the product of a
continuing stream of immigrants who contributed new ideas in the making of
our variegated culture. Yet for most of this century we have viewed our role
more as a creditor than a debtor nation in terms of ideas and ideals.
Especially during the last three decades we have turned inward, increasingly
doubtful that we have any more to give and or to learn from abroad. The
imports we accept tend, like the trade in automobiles, to be the value-added
versions of what we already make. With an intellectual smugness that
approaches self-satisfied conceit, we are considerably less willing to consider
ideas that fundamentally challenge our political and social beliefs. Thus the
first lesson I believe we have to learn from the Japanese is the need and
willingness to consider fundamentally different ideas about society and social
behavior.
The second lesson is as basic -as the first. The cause of Japan's success
is really quite simple to identify-although perhaps not to explain. Japan's
only real resource is its people, but it has evolved a cultural and institutional
environment in which this single resource has been able to achieve wonders.
Japan is not simply a country of disciplined, hard-working, highly literate,
team-playing, competitive achievers. It is rather a nation in which large
numbers of average, everyday people strive to practice self-discipline, to
work hard, to learn as much as they can, to work cooperatively together, and
to compete effectively with each other and the rest of the world. They could
and would not make this effort, I believe, without the belief that in the end
they gain, and that what they gain in comparison to others is fair. This belief
is sustained through a recognition that all have a stake, that all belong, that no
person is fully independent from the rest. In a word, they recognize that they
form a community.
The communitarian orientation of industrial Japan cannot be explained
simply as a natural extension of traditional village or familial values and
patterns of social behavior. Although embedded values and habits of village
life have provided a supportive cultural context, Japan's contemporary
economic and political organizations have themselves acquired characteristic
features of village communities as a result of trial, error, and conscious
choices to achieve effective teamwork and control. Japan's economic success
and its political achievement as a stable democracy rest in large measure on
the adaptation of traditional village patterns of economic and political life to
Western institutions and organizations. We have thus much to learn about the
creation of communities from the Japanese experience.
To begin with the basics, what does the Japanese experience teach
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about the fundamental elements of a community? First and foremost, Japan
shows us that communities are best maintained by sharing power as well as
gains. At least in Japan, the sense of community, in both the nation and the
firm, has required that power be widely shared. Despite a hierarchy of
leadership, Japan's modem communities involve a significant degree of
participatory equality. Labor does have a voice in what we often regard as
exclusively managerial decisions. American corporate reformers attempting
to replicate Japanese managerial practices often ignore the features that
effectively empower labor. The power-sharing aspects of labor-management
relations is a telling example of Japan's reliance on consensus, rather than
majoritarian decision-making, in nearly all organizations and contexts.
Consensus empowers by giving each participant a voice in decisions.
Everyone at least has a say, and those with the greatest interests or most at
stake have to find ways to accommodate other interests and preferences.
Majoritarian rule, in contrast, empowers only those who hold the voting
balance. By the same token, majoritarian rule effectively excludes all
minority interests except by majority grace.
To be sure, consensus is a cumbersome and often impossible
mechanism for decisioh-making in any community, Japan included. The
Japanese solution is something akin to what happens when a consensus-based
faculty or partnership finds itself split: delegation to committees. In this
sense, Japan has evolved into a community of communities, each claiming a
degree of autonomy and decision-making authority. Japan's virulent variety
of bureaucratic rivalry, for example, can be viewed in these terms as a species
of a broader social phenomenon. Conflict over meaningful political
participation in Japan takes the form of access and membership to the
communities that have the authority to decide. Whether it is membership in
the trade association that gets to participate in decisions related to industrial
policy, or the less formal community of insiders whose opinion determines the
consensus of some other group, what counts is getting a seat at the table.
Getting the seat means sharing the decisional powers of the consensual
process.
Leadership becomes secondary. Almost anyone-usually the most
senior in age or other status-will do. However, to remain legitimate and
effective, leaders must accept responsibility for the well-being of the
community as a whole and must be vigilant that at least the sense of fairness
is maintained. As the price for their position leaders must set the example,
and they must lead effectively through persuasion to achieve consensus.
Command without community consensus does not work, but legitimate
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authority itself is a source of often forceful influence.
To be sure, Japan is not perfect. Everyday questions of fairness,
participation, and the legitimacy of leadership arise out of the ever-present
inequities Japan shares with all societies. The Japanese tend to respond,
however, in keeping with their fundamental beliefs and orientations.
Exposure of unfairness is usually sufficient to provoke corrective measures.
Wrongdoing by those in authority is especially serious, challenging the
foundations of the system. As a result, the response to political or
bureaucratic scandal is usually swift and telling: removal of the offender from
the position of authority by others in authority whose own legitimacy is
thereby tainted. In the case of individual misconduct, the Japanese generally
react as the communitarians they are-disapproving what they consider to be
unfair, condemning the wrong, but nearly always reinforcing the community
by reintegrating and re-embracing the corrected wrongdoers.
These corrective measures in effect reinforce and strengthen the
communitarian bias of the system itself. As the many communities that
comprise Japan exercise greater control they become more durable and more
cohesive. Functioning together, they contribute to the stability and cohesion
of Japan as a whole. The dynamics of Japan's communities thus help to hold
the system together.
I realize it is asking a great deal to suggest that we need to learn and
borrow something from these aspects of the Japanese reality. Many of the
communitarian aspects of Japanese life run counter to deeply held American
beliefs and preconceptions. I would like to suggest, however, that some are
more apposite than at first they may seem.
Communities require above all else recognition of the mutual
dependence of all members. Interdependence has remarkable centripetal pull.
Whether in a marriage or in the workplace, the belief that one gains more
within the partnership or the team than alone gives each participant a stake in
keeping the group together. It becomes difficult to ignore the needs and
wishes of others when you need them. Recognition of mutual need thus has a
more empowering dynamic than any law can bestow. A genuine and deep
appreciation that we all need each other, that we all belong irrespective of
differences in what we think or do, our beliefs and disbeliefs, our deeds or
misdeeds, is the starting point. From this recognition comes community and
the adhering commitment to consent, cooperation, and compromise.
The extent to which we are able and willing to learn this lesson
ultimately depends upon how captured we are by many of our own myths. A
cursory review of the self-images we project in both our popular culture as
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well as more scholarly self-assessments reveals a pre-occupation with
individualism, majoritarian democracy, and adversarial conflict as primary
elements of American success. As a result we may belittle or ignore
altogether the contributions of community, consensus, and cooperation. Yet
many if not most of our greatest achievements have resulted not from
individual effort or political and social conflict, but rather from community
efforts motivated by persuasive appeals to shared moral values. While
important conflicts have been catalysts of social and political change, the
greatest transformations in American social and political life were ultimately
the result of persuasion and consensus. The American West was won by the
wagon train not the cowboy--it was the cooperative efforts of migrating
people which created new communities in the territories they settled. Even
our technological achievements have been more the result of organization and
cooperation than individual innovation. Neither Bell nor Edison would have
become household names were it not for the organizations that realized the
fullest potential of their inventions. Our intellectual imprisonment has also
kept us from learning---unlike the Japanese-from our own treasure-trove of
historical and cultural experience. The integrative processes of community
and consensus are hardly novel to our Native American traditions or to many
of the religious communities of our European tradition.
And what of law? What role or function do the rules and processes of
law have in this? I believe law has two aspects: it serves both as a statement
of state-approved norms and an instrument of state coercion. Whether legal
rules also reflect community values depends, of course, on the nature of the
state and democratic processes. Assuming that democratic processes enable
greater consensus than simple parliamentary majoritarianism, legislated nles

and principles should in most instances reflect broad community agreement.
However, legal rules do have limits. Unless we wish to have the state define
our morals and ethics, we cannot allow all of our values to be expressed as
rules and principles of law. Thus whatever our legal rights, we are not free
from shared moral duties toward the community and each other.
The enforcement of legal rules is another matter. Obedience can be the
product of either persuasion or coercion. However subtle at times, there is a
difference. Once we begin to think that all legal rules have to be enforced by
the state, we obscure that difference and make law a matter of command and
coercion rather than principle and persuasion.
We are too apt to ignore the persuasive force of law and too quick to
demand its coercive application. If, after all, our legal rules are valid because
they reflect the community's judgment of what is correct and proper conduct
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and behavior, then we should be able to relax coercive state enforcement and
allow the informal processes of community control to work to assure
compliance. It may take longer and it may mean that not all will ever agree or
even comply, but the processes of consensus and community persuasion are
usually more -effective in the long run and certainly more respectful of the
basic dignity and worth of each member of the community.
Of all of our anti-communitarian tendencies, the increasing reliance on
As we
criminal sanctions is the most dangerously self-destructive.
criminalize more and more forms of misconduct and punish by isolation more
and more offenders, we waste more and more of our material and human
resources. We get little if any return from prisons. Isolation from the
community rarely corrects, and the collective isolation of offenders generally
produces new and more lethal outcasts. Imprisonment also contributes to the
destruction of the single most essential intermediary of any society, the
family. Large numbers of the inmates of our prisons are married. Over half
of them have dependent children. They all have parents and friends.
Expelling offenders from the community thus ruptures the most effective of
all social units for correction and control. As a consequence, our system of
criminal justice has become a factory for the creation of outcast communities
and crime.
We also need to be reminded that human rights and due process
protections are not a substitute for genuine community respect for the worth
of all -human beings. We may lead the world in legal protections for
individual human rights, but our constitutional guarantees have not prevented
us from also leading the world with the largest per capita prison population.
With one out of every four black males between the ages of 18 and 24 behind
bars, we can hardly claim that we truly uphold the basic dignity of all
individuals.
In the end the test of the goodness of any society is how it treats its
least favored members. For all of Japan's imperfections-and there are many
-Japan is, I submit, a better society than the one we are now creating.
Japan's material progress and safe streets are more than coincidental
consequences. They are both the products of deeply embedded belief in
community and mutual interdependence that tends-albeit imperfectly--to
give most members the sense that they share a stake in what Japan is and
becomes. It is this belief that enables Japanese to work hard, cooperatively
and competitively, and to strive to improve themselves and their neighbors.
Like Japan confronting Western capitalism in the mid-19th century, we
face a choice between clinging to our preconceptions and myths, isolated and
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refusing to learn, or to seek in cultures at home and abroad the underlying
causes of their success and, after avoiding their imperfections, to adapt by
trial and error those features that work for us. We cannot and should not try
to become Japan. There are worms in their apples too. To say that we
should begin to try to grow their apples without worms would be to fall prey
to that even more globally threatening paradigm in which communitarian
values themselves become a catalyst of division and self-destruction; better to
try, together with the Japanese, mutually to learn how to grow each other's
apples without worms.

